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The Church and
the Law
Thomas L. Shaffer
The image I want to use to talk about the church in the
state, from a Christian lawyer's point of view, is in two of
the novels of the late theological storyteller Walker Percy.
We Percy readers first saw the image in Love in the Ruins.
Percy's sub-title for that novel was 'The Adventures of a
Bad Catholic at a Time Near the End of the World." His
setting is the not-too-distant future in North America.
Social climate and civil discourse are even worse than they
are now. Percy's central figure, Dr. Thomas More, the bad
Catholic, and a few others remain in the old Roman
Catholic church, but the old Roman Catholic Church has
been changed. As Flannery O'Connor might have put it,
the truth has made them odd.
Thomas L. Shaffer, Robert and Marion Short professor of law
in the University of Notre Dwne, and supervising attorney in the
Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic, writes mostly about theological legal
ethics. His most recent books are American Lawyers and Their
Communities, written with his daughter Mary M. Shaffer (University ofNotre Dame Press, 1991), and Lawyers, Clients, and Moral
Responsibility, written with Robert F. Cochran, Jr. (West, 1994).
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The vast majority of Roman Catholics have left the old
Catholic church and have become American Catholics.
American Catholics are not odd. They have accepted that
the mission of Christianity in America is to make America
successful. They fit in, as Catholics have always wanted
to do in America. They have abandoned fealty toward and
respect for the Vatican, and have established a headquarters for their American church in Cicero, Illinois. They
retain the Mass in their worship; they play 'The Star
Spangled Banner" at the Elevation. American Catholics
loyally urge their children to kill whomever the dominant
group in Washington, D.C., wants killed, as their ancestors in the American Roman Catholic Church almost
always did. Theirs is a nationalistic theology, but it is a
theology. The God Who will bless America is the God of
Abraham and Jesus. American Catholics are thus to be
distinguished from a third Catholic group, called the
Dutch Schismatics, who, Dr. More says, believe in relevance, but not in God.
The odd, old Roman Catholics also believe in God, but
they are not likely to kill anybody. \They are a fragile and
fragilely put together, gathered church. They have been
exiled by the American Catholics, but not eradicated. They
are a diffuse people, "scattered and demoralized"; they
wander around at the edges of the forest in Louisiana. The
only thing they still gather for is the Eucharist, presided
over by a reclusive, eccentric cleric named Father Rinaldo
Smith, "an obscure curate, who remained faithful to Rome,
could not support himself and had to hire out as a
fire-watcher. It is his job to climb the fire tower by night
and watch for brushfires below and for signs and portents
in the skies." Except when he presides over the Eucharist,
Father Smith has "fallen into silence." The Eucharist is
all the odd old church meets for in the time Percy first
describes; he speaks of the church as "a tiny scattered
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flock with no place to go." Dr. More contemplates his
church and expects the world to end soon.
Toward the end of the later novel, The Thanatos Syndrome-the world having not ended-Father Smith is still
watching at the top of the fire tower, but he has begun to
do some other things. He now presides over an AIDS
hospice at the foot of the fire tower. He has reclaimed his
power of speech. He is "in his right mind and very much
in charge. Very much his old wiry, vigorous self, he jokes
with the children, listens to the endless stories of the
senile, talks at great length with the dying." Father Smith
sends for help from Dr. More, who drinks too much and is
still a bad Catholic, ''when the depression and terrors of
[the hospice's] AIDS patients are more than [Father Smith]
can handle."
The priest and the psychiatrist, both professionals,
acting professionally, both offi<;ially discredited, do not
think of what they do as providing professional service.
They think of what they do as done in the church, there
in the hospice, by the fire tower, among the ruins of their
society. The church is the AIDS hospice: 'We ... visit . ..
listen, speak openly, we to them, they to us, and we to each
other in front of them, about them and about our own
troubles, we being two old drunks and addled besides.
They advise us about alcohol [and] diet . . . ." The world
has not come to an end; it does not come to an end in these
stories. Percy's bad Catholic only thought he knew when
the world would come to an end.
The church as AIDS hospice is finally ready, I think, to
talk about what the church should do and be, so long as
the world and the church in the world last. I suppose that
is what they are talking about, in fact, when they talk
about dying, about hope, about waiting, because, as Father Smith says it, it is not up to us in the church to say
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whether the world will end. "But it is for us to say .
, whether hope and faith will come back into the world."
I hope I respect Walker Percy's mood when I imagine a
young woman at the AIDS hospice, which is the church,
speaking up in one of these conversations in the church,
and saying, "I am thinking of going to law school and
becoming a lawyer." I hope I respect Percy when I imagine
further that the church, as constituted, there at the foot
of the fire tower, its pastor employed to keep an eye out for
signs and portents, can talk about whether this young
woman should do what she is thinking of doing. And,
fmally, I hope I respect Percy's understanding of membership in the church when I imagine that this young woman
will submit her decision to the consensus of the church,
to what John Howard Yoder calls "the communal quality
of belief." Then, when she goes out to practice law, if she
ever does, she will go out from the church and the church
will say to her, "Keep in touch."
It is odd to begin consideration of a lawyer's theology
of church and state with this shifting image from Walker
Percy's theology, but it is important to do it this way
because law and lawyer professionalism in North America
are profoundly untruthful about the way church and state
. , (or, if you like, the church and the law) fit together.
Lawyers in Canada and the United States are trained to
regard religious congregations as intruders on the liberal
democratic political experiment, as if we had crafted our
political and legal dispositions, drafted and haggled over
our constitutions, and come to a Hobbesian modus vivendi-all of that-and then the church came along to
;_, complicate and frustrate our workable arrangement. ·, And
we, in our political wisdom, found no way to deal with the
church-no way at all. We deal with the church-we
lawyers-by treating it as a consequence of individual,
autonomous choice. Instead of contemplating the church
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in the law as legally significant, we deal with legal theories
of individual religious liberty that regard each free citizen
as his own tyrant. We permit each citizen to join whatever
private clubs he wants to join, including, when he really
must, a religious club.
This legal disposition, this North American jurisprudence of the church and the law, studied in our professional schools as part of constitutional law, sub-titled "the
law of church and state," is profoundly untruthful. It
assumes an ugly, false, and corrupted anthropology. It
denies its citizens the refuge of mediating associations
between itself and each of them. It describes the human
person as fundamentally alone. But it is a powerful
influence in the law and among lawyers. And it has behind
it, as occasion demands, the lethal power of the state.
· ?People come to law school and adopt' it as their working
account of the way the church and the state fit together,
and, before you know it, it becomes not only an anthropology and a jurisprudence but a theology as well: Lawyers
talk about the church in these liberal-democratic terms
even as they continue to maintain faithful membership in
their religious communities-serve in the vestry, sing in
the choir, lead the minyan in prayer, read the scriptures
aloud during services.
***
The inquiry I propose to make here, in respect, I hope,
for Walker Percy, for whom the church was all that was
left, is an inquiry about a theological jurisprudence in
which the church comes first. It is not an easy inquiry; it
is not an inquiry at all, really, so much as it is the
description of an argument, an argument in the church,
about the law.2
One heresy-the heresy Percy describes as the theology
of the American Catholic Church-should be excluded
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quickly. Its argument is that the church must be subservient to the law. The roots of the heresy are ancient and
biblical; the reason it is heresy has to do not with power
but with worship. What the Lord said to Moses and the
children of Israel when they camped on the borders of
Canaan was a civic agenda, since Israel did not attempt to
separate church and state, but it had to do with worship,
with what this nation of priests was not allowed to worship
as they settled into life among the Canaanites: ''You shall
not worship their gods" (Deuteronomy 7:5). To allow the
law to govern the church would be to put the law alongside
God. 'We," in the church, "must obey God rather than
men" (Acts 5:29). Almost all of the original Jewish followers of Jesus said that to the government, and the government killed almost all of them, along with thousands of
other Jews.
That leaves two possibilities: (1) A theology in which
the church is a group of resident aliens, like Percy's old,
odd Catholic Church, and (2) a theology that speaks from
a culture that includes the church but is broader than the
church-a theology of Christendom 3 The frrst, the theology of resident aliens, sees the church as a distinct culture,
and it understands the culture of the church to be morally
and legally primary. It claims that the church is the
chosen people-"a people consecrated to the Lord your
God; of all the peoples on earth the Lord your God chose
you," it says to-itself, "to be the treasured people" (Deuteronomy 7:6). A literal and physical people, as Israel was,
there in the desert with Moses, "a gathered, closed, and
concentrated people," in Karl Barth's phrase.
In the first theology, the church is separated-"gathered, closed, and concentrated," an embattled colony-not
because its members need to be exclusive, as if they were
a country club, but because they understand that they
have to be distinct in order to be obedient. Barth said the
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church is "not a centrifugal people disintegrating in all kinds
of peculiartties." The church's being gathered, closed, concentrated, and, if need be, embattled, is not primartly a moral
restriction, though. Its purpose is not purity. The restriction
is imposed so that God's chosen people can be priests. Israel
and then this gathered church-this first possibility for a
lawyer's theology of church and state, of the church and the
law-is separate for the sake ofthose who are not its members.
It is separate, for the sake of others, in obedience to two priestly
mandates from its Lord:
(A) The church preseives its identity in order to tell
truth, so that there will be a visible place, in the society
of strangers that is the world, where the truth is told.
The Hebrew notion here is the notion of the prophetic,
not as telling the future, but as telling the truth. The
church speaks to the law, tells the truth in the law, in
order to influence the exercise of coercive state power
that is the fundamental business of the law: Its "apparent inclusiveness ... [is] only the reverse side of
the comprehensiveness with which it regards the
manifestation of the glorious freedom of the children
of God as the hope of all humanity and indeed of the
whole of sighing creation," Barth said.
(B) The church is separate because it is evangelical.
It understands that its proper business is to seive the
spiritual destinies of every person who is outside it:
"Only this narrow place can offer a vista of the wider
sphere which includes those who are still outside, who
are not yet the children of God ... but who one day
may become and be so," Barth said.
That is the way a lawyer might describe the first
theology, the resident-alien theology of the church and the
law. It is a theological ethic of the church as normatively
primary. The state is not the church's partner in moral
action. The state is rather one of those "authorities and
potentates of this dark world" of which St. Paul speaks
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(Ephesians 6: 12). The law is not evil; it is even, in some
mysterious way, sustained by God (Romans 1:1-7). But,
still, the law is not nonnative. It is no more determinative
for action in and from the church than a hurricane would
be. The law is not necessarily an idol, either-and therefore, usually, by and large, the church can speak to the
law-but it can become an idol, and therefore the stern
injunction at the borders of Canaan applies to the law:
"You shall consign the images of their gods to the fire; you
shall not covet the silver and gold on them and keep it for
yourselves ... for that is abhorrent to the Lord your God"
(Deuteronomy 7:5).
The modern ecclesiastical history of this theology-the
memory of the church that this understanding consultsis clearest in the Radical Reformation; its denominational
descendants are the Anabaptists and many other kinds of
Baptists; its memory reaches through the martyrs of the
sixteenth century free church back to a primitive church
that believed it could not admit government officials to
membership. It is because this gathered church is radically free that it can remember to adopt narrow criteria for
membership: It can define membership in terms of adherence to practices such as the refusal to kill people-so that
obeying Jesus is not consistent with being a soldier or a
police officer or a judge. Individuals who disagree are
invited to agree, but they are not invited to join up so long
as they disagree (not killing, for example, has often been
definitional for this tradition in the church). Groups who
agree in their disagreement are free to form their own
congregations-and they do, as is evident in the proliferation of organizations and movements, from Southern Baptists to Pentecostals to Old Order Amish, that trace their
theological inspiration to the sixteenth century Anabaptists.

The Church and the Law

115

Its organizational witness to the more "civilized" mainline church is a church that respects the state and in
many, perhaps most, ways subordinates itself in civil
society, but is distinct in civil society. This church says
that the mainline church and most of Western Judaismfrom the bishops who made peace with the Roman Emperor Constantine, through the burghers who protected
and compromised the congregational churches of the Reformation, to organized religion in twentieth century North
America-gave up their prophetic and evangelical possibility when they handed the church over to the authorities
and the potentates. The Latin American Roman Catholic
Bishops, at their conference in Medellin in 1986, seem to
have wanted the church back. They said, 'The church . . .
should be manifested, in an increasingly clear manner, as
truly poor, missionary, and paschal, separate from all temporal power. . . . " Their non-Baptist, modem manifesto
shows perhaps, as the church by the fire tower does, what
is left from nationalistic Catholicism, described by Gustavo
Gutierrez as a church "that has hitherto existed in a situation that might be described as 'Christendom'."
All Jews and Christians are influenced by these notions, if only because all of us believers realize down deep
there cannot be a theology based in the law. All of us worry
from time to time about the heresy and the idolatry of
statism, and, when we do, we tum to an alternative that
seems not to compromise with the state. We tum in that
direction, and listen. We think we might learn something,
and we do. We realize then that we are influenced too
much by the law.
We listen to the resident-alien theologians. We get defensive about our statism, for a while, until the benefits of
the law cause us to forget that we are meant to be resident
aliens. Then we go back to listening to the law, in the law,
and come to speak of the gathered church as an inL--uder on

118

Thomas L. Shaffer

The Second Vatican Council began its pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world: 'The joys and the
hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of ... this age ... these
are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the
followers of Christ." Not only is it hard to tell the difference
between these two sets ofjoys, hopes, griefs, and anxieties;
there isn't any difference.
The church does not meet and formulate a prophetic
agenda to be announced within earshot of the courthouse;
its active adherents, rather, go over to the courthouse to
find out what is going on over there, before they speak from
the memory of the church to what is going on over there.
'The community of faith . . . gives itself to the service of
all," as Gustavo Gutierrez puts it. 'The definitive reality is
built on what is transitory."
The practical processes consequent on this second
theology of church and state are processes of entanglement in the business of the modern democratic-liberal
nation-state. No one in the mainline church would deny,
I think, that the church, in following such an ecclesiology,
runs the risk of being corrupted by worldly entanglements.
The church of Christendom runs the risk, in its theology,
oflosing sight of what it is and what it is for. It often comes
to be, in Malcolm Boyd's phrase, chaplain for the status
quo. It has, in the view of many Christians, come to stand
for not much of anything that sounds prophetic. There is
no more disturbing example of this than the fact that the
church of Christendom has almost always been enthusiastic about its princes' warfare, has almost always been
willing to urge its sons to kill for the state, and to bid its
women to be like the mothers of Sparta: mothers who urge
their sons to come home with their shields or on them.
What keeps this vulnerable mainline theology nonetheless plausible is its concern for the possibilities of justice
and peace. It is an optimistic theology. one in which the
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Christian lawyer's understanding of church and state
offers the church as available for almost any kind of
theoretical or material service to the community-from
rolling bandages for the army to voter registration, from
education in civic virtue to nuclear research. But it is often
difficult to see in what way service to war or nationalistic
interests or trendy notions about social justice is priestly
or prophetic. Certainly the churches who offer such services pay a pastoral price for what they do. They so
dissipate their energy that they become less and less able
to devote themselves in particular, practical ways to their
closest adherents. When they are most visibly contentious, their members seem to be mostly concerned with
social movements, with political causes that rarely if ever
are formed among Jews and Christians. Witness on the
one hand popular American disregard for religious leaders'
prophetic statements on war, capital punishment, and the
welfare system, and, on the other, the disappearance of
ordinary pastoral visits to the homes of members of local
congregations.
These compromises and costs affect theological social
ethics. Those who devote their principal energy to economic and political reform want to be effective. They want
results-if only because their causes obscure their understanding that the purposes of the church are eschatological. Success in bending the government's will is how you
know that what you are doing is worthwhile. But concern
for effectiveness entails a certain entropy in the moral
witness which gave rise to the need to be effective. One
thinks of Mother Teresa of Calcutta, who said the Christian task is not to be successful; it is to be faithful. There
is also the persistent danger that the theological ethic of
the mainline church will become an ethic of necessary evil.
The mainline American church's principal theologian in
this century has been Reinhold Niebuhr, but I suspect

120

Thomas L. Shaffer

Niebuhr's success, if not his thought, was more an effect
than a cause of the mainline believers' impulse to make
America work.
My friend and colleague Robert E. Rodes expresses this
influence as a tension. In his recently completed threevolume history of the Anglican establishment, he names
what I have been talking about as mainline church theology after a sixteenth century Swiss physician named
Erastus. Erastianism is the theology that sees the church
as having, first.a responsibility to offer an agenda to the
"wider society" and, second, a responsibility for the spiritual welfare of all people in the civil society in which it finds
itself. In the Erastian account, the "wider society" learns
to be open to Christian (and Jewish) moral witness; that
is its habit, because it remains, in some sense, Christendom. The prince is a Christian who invites his pastors to
speak to him about being a prince. Believers assume they
can hold and discharge public offices of most kinds without violence to conscience; and, Rodes says, most people
in the civil society in some way entertain the possibility of
closer adherence to traditional religious practice.
Erastianism is, though, thin theological stuff. It takes
its historical force among us American lawyers (Anglophiles all) from the fact that Britain has been able to
sustain such a civil disposition with relatively little bloodshed and without losing its state church. But it is thin
stuff when compared with the radicalism of the Gospel and
of the Hebrew Prophets. Rodes shows how Erastianism
survives in Britain because it is in tension with what he
calls high churchmanship, as a counterforce and, I think,
religious witness. My reflection on Rodes's account is that
high-church argument within Anglicanism has had a force
in Britain rather like that I have suggested to be the effect
of modem socially-conscious Anabaptism and evangelicalism in North America.
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All of this is an academic lawyer's theology. It is an
intellectual construct. It does not describe the way we in
the university are preparing those who will act as leaders
in the government and in the church of Christendom. If I
had described what we do, we academic lawyers who are
also believers might be content not to argue further, at
least not at present. The theology of the resident aliens
would be somewhere in our consciousness, reminding us
believers to obey God and not men. The Erastian church
would be telling us believers not to take ourselves too
seriously as we slog along trying to be nationalistic Christians and Jews. The awareness of our students would be
opened in a coherent way to the possibility that a believer
can use civil power without being corrupted by it.
But the students who come to us now-almost all of
them, and almost without regard to what their earlier
training has been-are not interested in the Erastian-sectarian tension. They have a different agenda: They are
convinced that religion is private. To the extent that they
attend to church-state issues as public, they let the law
define (that is, ignore) the church. They do not perceive
enough of the remnants of Christendom around them to
feel its significance. The question is what we have to say
to them about the church and the law, when we know we
have nothing to say for the morals and jurisprudence that
would make a god of the state, or to claim that the civil
community can function with no god at all.
Looking at this in terms of the vocation I pursue, a
lawyer who trains lawyers, and looking at our students as
the sometimes curious customers to whom we offer our
theologies , I have come to feel that the theology of the
resident aliens is the only theology of church and state
that has enough potential clarity to make any difference
as education. This is circumstantial; only God knows
what students will be like in twenty years. But circum-
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stances shape theology, which is, asBonhoeffer said, the
memory of the church-only that, but no less than that.

And the evident circumstance is that the church in the
twenty-first century in the Christian West will not be able
to use lawyers' ambiguity any more. It will need the
simplicity of the primitive church. It may well produce
martyrs, as the primitive church did, and as sixteenth
century Anabaptism did.
***

My fancy played on Walker Percy's description to imagine a young woman raising a question, in the church,
about what we Catholics used to refer to as her apostolate.
I suppose the church might decide against her being a
lawyer. Maybe a Christian cannot be a lawyer, at least not
at the time and in the place where the church finds itself
when the question is put to it. That conclusion would end
my imaginary story, though, and so I imagine that the
church advises her that she should go ahead and enroll in
law school.
Maybe the church would decide to advise her to go
ahead because it would hear her say that she planned to
serve her neighbors and to tell them-her clients mostlywhat she knows from the Gospel about how to live with
the law. She would also plan to use her power as a lawyer
in reference to what she has perceived about the world as
she looks at the world from the church, in the law. She
will take professional and official life as she finds it, and
she will do what she can within its limited vision of its
destiny; but she will not surrender or forget what she has
seen of this world when she has looked at it from the
church, nor will she now look at the world in any other
way. She will not leave the church to be a lawyer. The
awakened, gathered church will not allow her to leave it.
In Karl Barth's model, it will meet in order to separate and
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separate in order to meet; but in its meeting and in its
separating the church will not let go of this young lawyer.
She will be a peculiar lawyer. Her lawyer's theology of
church and state, like all of her theology, will be primarily
formed from the memory she has awakened to among the
resident aliens-a memory that reaches back to the Acts
of the Apostles, to Francis of Assisi, to the, alas, only
occasional Catholic martyr to pacifism, but also to the
church that has been shattered and severed on the anvil
of statism in the twentieth century and to what I imagine
as a consequent and revived sense of connection to the
Radical Reformation.
She will keep in touch. She will come back to join her
life, her belief, and her prayer, to the communal quality of
belief, and ponder in that communal belief what she
should do as an actor in the law and an agent of state
power in America.

NOTES
1 The essay here is a condensed version of a chapter in a festschrift
in memory of the late William Stringfellow, edited by Andrew W. McThenia,
Jr., forthcoming from Eerdmans and used here with permission.
2 It is embarrassing to use "church'' in this way, but I don't know
how to avoid it. I mean, almost always, to speak as much of Jews, and of
Jewish congregational life, as of Christians and of the church. Jews of
course have these arguments within their congregations, and across them,
and with God, and they sometimes join in discussions with Christians,
bounded by our shared tradition, which are, in the sense I try to write about
here, discussions in the church.
3 I borrow the metaphor and much else from Stanley Hauerwas and
William H. Willimon, Resident AUens (Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1989); I
borrow some of the much else from Walter Brueggemann, 'The Transformative Agenda of the Pastoral Office," Interpretation and Obedience: From
Faithful Reading to Faithfel Uving (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991).

